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Beyond Nondiscrimination:
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
and the Further Federalization of
U.S. Arbitration Law
Edward P. Boyle
David N. Cinotti*
On April 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, which presented the question whether the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state law that denies the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement as unconscionable because the agreement bars class
The Court held that California’s version of the
arbitration.1
unconscionability doctrine, which renders consumer arbitration agreements
barring classwide arbitration unconscionable, was not one of the “grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” protected from
federal preemption under the FAA. 2
Concepcion has drawn widespread attention because of its potential
effects on consumer class actions. However, the decision is also important
because it represents yet another step in the federalization of U.S. arbitration
law at the expense of state law. The decision in Concepcion is part of a
series of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the line
between state contract law and federal arbitration law. The case law has
created some tension as to the relative roles of state and federal law in the
interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements. The U.S. Supreme
Court has said, on the one hand, that arbitration is a matter of contract and
that contracts are ordinarily governed by state law. On the other hand, it has
said that federal restraints on state contract law must be imposed to prevent

* Edward P. Boyle is a partner at Venable LLP and co-chair of the firm’s New York Commercial
Litigation practice group. David N. Cinotti is an associate in Venable LLP’s New York Commercial
Litigation practice group. Both have substantial experience litigating and advising clients on issues
involving the Federal Arbitration Act.
1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
2. Id. at 1742.
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frustration of the FAA’s main purposes—to reverse the traditional judicial
opposition to arbitration and to ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms. Concepcion increases the federal
restraints on state contract law by holding that even the application of a
generally available contract defense like unconscionability, as interpreted by
a state’s highest court, can be preempted under the FAA.3 Of equal
importance, Concepcion also expands the implicit purposes of the FAA—by
preempting the application of general state contract defenses when those
defenses conflict with fundamental attributes of arbitration as envisioned in
the FAA.4
In finding preemption of California’s unconscionability defense,
Concepcion made clear that section 2 of the FAA (the Saving Clause) 5 does
not prevent preemption of state contract rules that conflict with the federal
vision of arbitration—streamlined, efficient, and party-directed dispute
resolution.6 The Court’s ruling found that a rule requiring classwide
arbitration absent express party agreement conflicts with these federal
principles.7 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court held that California’s version of
unconscionability was preempted.8
Part I of this Article addresses the scope and provisions of the FAA
relevant to the decision in Concepcion and the federal–state balance in
arbitration law, or “arbitral federalism.” Part II discusses the U.S. Supreme
Court’s past arbitral–federalism decisions. Part III explains the issues
presented in Concepcion and summarizes the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. Finally, in Part IV explains the implications of the
decision for arbitral federalism. This Part discusses how Concepcion
furthers the expansion of federal arbitration law at the expense of state
contract law, and how the decision follows a line of cases that makes federal
common law dominant in arbitration cases.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1745.
See infra text accompanying note 17.
Id.
Id. at 1748.
Id.
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I.

THE ROLE OF STATE LAW UNDER THE FAA

The FAA, enacted in 1925, prescribes federal rules for all arbitration
agreements that fall within the broad scope of the Commerce Clause. 9
Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
10
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

Section 2 requires courts to interpret and enforce an arbitration
agreement as they would any other contract. Arbitration agreements may
only be denied enforcement “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.”11 Section 2 thus establishes a federal
rule that courts cannot disfavor arbitration agreements as compared to other
types of contracts. Instead, courts must apply general contract principles to
determine the validity of arbitration agreements. Aside from preventing
courts from treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other
contracts—nondiscrimination, that is—section 2 does not expressly impose
any federal rules regarding the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration
agreements.12
As discussed in the next section, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has
applied FAA section 2 to impose federal limitations on the application of
state law to arbitration agreements beyond mere nondiscrimination. 13 These
decisions have created a body of substantive federal common law that
imposes various rules favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. 14 In
so doing, these decisions have led to difficult questions regarding the
preemptive scope of section 2 and the federal common law that the courts
have established pursuant to it.

9. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995) (holding that the FAA’s
scope is coextensive with the Commerce Clause).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947) (emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1957).
14. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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II. PRIOR DECISIONS ON ARBITRAL FEDERALISM
In order to understand Concepcion’s implications for arbitral federalism,
it is helpful to understand the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in the area. The U.S. Supreme Court has decided a number of
cases that, explicitly and implicitly, address the respective roles of state and
federal law regarding the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration
agreements. The discussion of these cases below traces part of the evolution
of FAA section 2 through what Justice O’Connor has called “the FAA’s . . .
colorful history.”15
The U.S. Supreme Court has established generally applicable federal
rules on the interpretation and enforceability of arbitration agreements, while
at other times emphasizing the primary role of state contract law in the
interpretation and enforceability of arbitration agreements under FAA
section 2. These two approaches seem to be dictated by sometimescompeting views on how to reverse judicial hostility to arbitration—by
enforcing arbitration agreements like any other contract or by supporting
(and defining the contents of) a federal policy favoring arbitration. The
tension between these two views is evident in Concepcion.
A. The FAA Creates Federal Substantive Law
One of the U.S. Supreme Court’s earliest federalism decisions
concerning the FAA was Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co., decided in 1967.16 In Prima Paint, the Court noted that
the FAA’s purpose was to “make arbitration agreements as enforceable as
other contracts, but not more so.”17 But the Court also recognized a federal
rule relating to the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements
that went beyond equalizing arbitration agreements and other contracts
under state law.18 The Court held that arbitrators, and not the courts, must
decide a claim that the contract in which an arbitration clause is contained
15. Id. at 35 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
16. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395. The U.S. Supreme Court decided eight cases under the FAA
before Prima Paint. Of those cases, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)
might be considered a federalism decision. The Court there held that state law, not the FAA,
governed the enforcement of an arbitration agreement that did not involve a maritime transaction or
a transaction involving commerce. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-01. Bernhardt was important
because it suggested that the right to arbitration was a matter of “substantive” law rather than
procedure, and thus that the FAA might prescribe substantive rights, a holding which later provided
a basis for the Court’s application of section 2 to cases in state courts. See id. at 204.
17. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 n.12.
18. See id. at 419-23.
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was fraudulently induced. 19 The Court determined that Congress had the
constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to establish this
separability principle for federal courts; it did not decide whether the FAA
applied in state courts.20 The Court implicitly recognized in Prima Paint
that, at least with regard to actions in federal court, courts could apply
federal rules beyond section 2’s nondiscrimination principle to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements.
It was not until the early 1980s, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court
firmly established that the FAA does more than render arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal court. In Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.21 and Southland Corp. v. Keating,22
the Court established principles that substantially expanded the role of the
FAA and led to much of the confusion that exists today.
In Moses H. Cone, the Court described section 2 as “the primary
substantive provision of the Act,” and stated that it is a “congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary.”23 The Court held that section 2 “create[s] a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement
within the coverage of the Act,” whether in state or federal court. 24 Thus,
courts should not look solely to state contract law when determining the
extent to which an arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable because
“questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration.”25 The Court announced a federal rule
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.”26

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 403.
See id. at 405.
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24-25.
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The Court continued the federalization of arbitration law in Southland,
in which it reaffirmed that section 2 of the FAA “declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration.”27 The Court concluded that the FAA “rests on the
authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce
Clause,” and, given Congress’s intent to end judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements and the failure of state law to correct that hostility, the Court
held that FAA section 2 applies in both federal and state courts.28 The Court
also held that section 2 “foreclose[s] state legislative attempts to undercut
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”29 Applying these principles,
the Court concluded that FAA section 2 preempted a California statute that
required judicial resolution of claims relating to franchise disputes. 30
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.31 He agreed with
Justice O’Connor, who dissented, that the 1925 Congress, which passed the
FAA, intended the statute to be procedural in nature and not to create any
substantive federal law.32 But Justice Stevens explained that “intervening
developments in the law” compelled the conclusion that the FAA applies in
both federal and state courts.33 Justice Stevens dissented, in part, because he
believed that California’s policy against arbitration of franchise disputes was
a ground to revoke a contract under section 2’s Saving Clause.34 Because
the Saving Clause “does not define what grounds for revocation may be
permissible,” Justice Stevens maintained that “the judiciary must fashion the
limitations as a matter of federal common law.” 35 Instead of adopting
uniform federal grounds to invalidate arbitration agreements, Justice Stevens
argued that federal courts should adopt state law as federal common law,
provided that the state grounds do not conflict with section 2’s policies.36
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. She argued
that the majority improperly extended federal power because “Congress
intended to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
See id. at 11-15.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 10, 16.
Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
See id. at 18-21.
See id.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 19-21.
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agreements.” 37 Justice O’Connor surveyed the legislative history of the
FAA and argued that “the 1925 Congress emphatically viewed the FAA as a
procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived . . . largely from
the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”38
Moses H. Cone and Southland began the expansion of the federal
common law of arbitration. They held that section 2 creates substantive law
that preempts state law and that applies even in state court. However, these
cases theoretically left intact the application of state contract law to the
interpretation of arbitration agreements and to general defenses to
enforcement of arbitration agreements.
B. The Court Wavers Between Establishing Federal Substantive Law and
Emphasizing State Contract Law
After Moses H. Cone and Southland established that FAA section 2
creates federal substantive law that applies in federal and state court,
questions inevitably arose as to the preemptive scope of that substantive law.
Subsequent decisions addressed these questions.
The Court’s 1987 decision in Perry v. Thomas39 is particularly relevant
to the issues in Concepcion. Perry held that FAA section 2 preempted a
California statute that permitted suits to collect unpaid wages “without
regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”40
The Court’s decision included an important footnote regarding
federalism concerns in which the Court stated that “[a] choice-of-law
issue . . . arises when defenses such as . . . unconscionability arguments are
asserted.”41 According to the Court, “the text of § 2 provides the touchstone
for choosing between state-law principles and the principles of federal
common law envisioned by the passage of [the FAA]” when deciding
whether an arbitration agreement can be revoked under section 2’s Saving
Clause.42 The Court reasoned that:

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 25.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
See id. at 484, 490-91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 492 n.9.
Id.
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[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [under section 2’s
Saving Clause] if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability,
and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this
43
requirement of § 2.

This language is important to Concepcion because it states the standard
for the application of contract defenses under the Saving Clause as well as
suggests that those defenses are a matter of state law.
While Justice Stevens reasoned in Southland that section 2’s Saving
Clause authorized the creation of federal common law defenses to
enforcement of arbitration agreements and that courts should look to state
law to define those defenses, the Court in Perry suggested that state contract
law directly applies under the Saving Clause. 44 Both Justice Stevens in
Southland and the Court in Perry agreed that federal common law preempts
state contract defenses in limited circumstances. 45 The Perry Court
explained that courts may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today
the state legislature cannot.” 46 The issue before the Court did not require
this discussion of unconscionability and other contract defenses, and thus
these statements might be considered dicta.
In a case decided two years after Perry, the Court turned its emphasis
from the preemptive scope of federal common law on the enforcement of
arbitration agreements to the role of state contract law in the interpretation of
those agreements.47 In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior University,48 the Court described the purpose of
the FAA as putting arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts.49 The Court noted the pro-arbitration policy recognized in Moses
H. Cone, but it explained that the true purpose of the policy “is simply to
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to
arbitrate,” which must be interpreted under state contract law. 50 These
principles led the Court to defer to the California Court of Appeal’s

43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id.; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 19 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
46. Id.
47. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 478.
50. Id. at 476.
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conclusion that a California choice-of-law clause called for the application
of California arbitration law, rather than the FAA, to determine whether a
court should stay the parties’ arbitration pending related litigation.51
The Court in Volt also held that the FAA did not preempt the California
law at issue.52 It explained that “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive
provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field
of arbitration.”53 The FAA therefore only preempts state law that “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” 54 Congress’s primary purpose for enacting the
FAA was to “require[] courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.”55 According
to the Court, staying arbitration under California law “is fully consistent
with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed
where the [FAA] would otherwise permit it to go forward.”56
Volt is an important case for a number of reasons. Most notably, it
diverged from the Court’s prior decisions, enlarging the substantive federal
common law recognized in Moses H. Cone and Southland. The Volt Court
limited the preemptive effect of that federal common law by emphasizing
the traditional state control over interpretation and enforcement of
contracts.57 The Court also sought to minimize its prior statements regarding
a federal pro-arbitration policy by equating that policy with the goal of
putting arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts.58
Thus, Volt sought to halt the expansion of federal arbitration law at the
expense of state contract law and suggested that the FAA had only a modest
preemptive effect on state law.
In 1995, however, the Court implicitly shifted its emphasis back to
federal common law regarding the interpretation and enforcement of
arbitration agreements. In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,59 the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
See id. at 477.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 479.
See id.
See id.
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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question was whether the Kaplans, who were not parties to an arbitration
agreement between a company that they owned and First Options of
Chicago, Inc., were required to arbitrate under that agreement. 60 The Court
addressed what it called a narrow issue: “[W]ho—court or arbitrator—has
the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to arbitrate.”61
The Court explained that the answer to this question is simply a matter of the
parties’ intent, which is ordinarily determined according to state contract
law.62 However, the Court added a “qualification” imposed as a matter of
federal law: unless there is “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the
parties agreed to arbitrate questions regarding the arbitrability of a dispute,
the court, not an arbitrator, decides whether a dispute is subject to
arbitration.63 The Court contrasted this federal rule with the federal rule
recognized in Moses H. Cone: “[T]he law treats silence or ambiguity
about . . . who (primarily) should decide arbitrability differently from the
way it treats silence or ambiguity about . . . whether a particular meritsbased dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement.” 64 The “law” to which the Court referred was federal common
law, not state contract law.
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,65 decided the same
year as First Options, the Court significantly undermined its holding in Volt
six years earlier. The issue in Mastrobuono was whether a New York
choice-of-law clause in a contract calling for arbitration under the rules of
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD Rules) meant that
New York state law determined whether the arbitrator could award punitive
damages.66 The Court recognized that, under Volt, parties may choose to
incorporate in their contract state rules that limit the issues subject to
arbitration.67 New York law prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages, but the NASD Rules did not. 68 Thus, if the parties intended to
adopt New York law, which precludes arbitrators from awarding punitive

60. Id. at 942.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 944.
63. See id. The Court took this clear-and-unmistakable test from prior cases concerning labor
arbitration pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act. See id. (citing AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (1960)).
64. Id. at 944-45.
65. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
66. See id. at 55.
67. See id. at 58.
68. Id. at 59.
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damages, the courts would be required to enforce that agreement. 69 On the
other hand, the Court explained, “if the contracting parties agree to include
claims for punitive damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA
ensures that their agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a
rule of state law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration.”70
The issue for the Court, therefore, was “what the contract has to say about
the arbitrability of [a] claim for punitive damages.”71
The Court determined that the choice-of-law clause was likely nothing
more than a substitute for the conflict-of-laws analysis that otherwise would
determine what law to apply; the clause was not an “unequivocal exclusion
of punitive damages claims.”72 The Court also held that any ambiguity as to
whether claims for punitive damages could be arbitrated have to be resolved
in favor of arbitration under federal law, and that state-law contract
principles provide that an ambiguous contract should be construed against
the drafters.73 The Court concluded that the best way to harmonize the
choice-of-law and arbitration clauses was “to read ‘the laws of the State of
New York’ to encompass substantive principles that New York courts would
apply, but not to include special rules on arbitrators’ authority.”74
It is difficult to determine whether the Court held that interpretation of
the arbitration and choice-of-law clauses were governed by state law, federal
common law, or both. Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, wrote that the
majority opinion “amounts to nothing more than a federal court applying
[state] contract law to an [arbitration] agreement . . . . [T]he majority’s
interpretation of the contract represents only the understanding of a single
federal court regarding the requirements imposed by state law.”75
If Justice Thomas was correct, that the Court was merely applying state
contract law to decide whether the parties intended to permit punitive
damages by adopting the NASD Rules or to exclude them by adopting New
York law, then other courts would be free to reach a different conclusion as
a matter of state law. Some lower courts, however, have interpreted
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 71-72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Mastrobuono to adopt a federal common law rule of interpretation that
choice-of-law clauses do not incorporate state law limiting arbitrators’
authority.76 For example, the Second Circuit has interpreted Mastrobuono to
hold that “federal policy favoring arbitration requires a specific reference to
[state law] restrictions on the parties’ substantive rights or the arbitrator’s
powers.”77
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals has rather
ambiguously said that “attention must also be paid” to Mastrobuono when
deciding whether a New York choice-of-law clause incorporated New
York’s rule that statute of limitations issues must be resolved by a court
rather than an arbitrator.78
A year after Mastrobuono, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,79 in which it repeated its holding that the FAA
preempts state laws that disfavor arbitration agreements as compared to
other contracts.80 The Court explained that “generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2,” but that courts
“may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable
only to arbitration provisions.” 81 The Court noted that section 2 “preclude[s]
States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring
instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as other
contracts.’”82
Based on these principles, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA
preempts a Montana statute requiring contracts containing arbitration clauses
to include a notice that the contract is subject to arbitration on the first page
of the contract in underlined capital letters. 83 The Court held that the “‘goals
and policies of the FAA . . . are antithetical to threshold limitations placed
specifically and solely on arbitration provisions.”84
More recently, in Preston v. Ferrer,85 the Court again relied on the
“national policy favoring arbitration” to hold that the FAA preempts state

76. See Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration
Act Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2250, 2268 (2002) (citing cases).
77. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 327-28 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
78. Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d 884, 889 (N.Y. 1997).
79. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
80. Id. at 686-87.
81. Id. at 687.
82. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
83. See id. at 684, 688.
84. Id. at 688.
85. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
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law. The statute at issue gave California’s labor commissioner exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes regarding talent-agency agreements.86 The Court
held that the FAA preempts the statute so that an arbitration agreement
calling for arbitration of a dispute within the labor commissioner’s exclusive
jurisdiction—according to the California statute—should be enforced. 87
Returning to an issue addressed in Volt and Mastrobuono, the Preston
Court rejected the argument that a California choice-of-law clause in the
parties’ contract incorporated the California talent-agency law at issue.88
The Court distinguished Volt on two grounds. First, Volt involved a stay of
arbitration pending litigation by parties not subject to the arbitration clause,
and the arbitration agreement did not address the order of proceedings in
such circumstances, so the Volt Court looked to the choice-of-law clause to
fill the gap.89 In contrast, the arbitration clause before the Court in Preston
expressly called for arbitration of the validity or legality of the contract
between the parties, which was the issue that fell within the labor
commissioner’s jurisdiction. Thus, unlike in Volt, “there is no procedural
void for the choice-of-law clause to fill.”90 The Preston Court therefore
interpreted Volt to mean that state law might act as a gap filler when an
arbitration agreement is silent, not that state law governs all issues of the
interpretation of arbitration agreements like it would other contracts.
Second, the Preston Court noted that the parties in Volt did not raise the
effect of arbitral rules incorporated in their arbitration agreement. 91 The
Court did not need to decide the relationship between a choice-of-law clause
and arbitral rules incorporated in an arbitration agreement until
Mastrobuono.92 Because the arbitration agreement in Preston provided for
arbitration in accordance with the American Arbitration Association rules,
which gave the arbitrators the power to determine the validity of the
contract, the Court held that Mastrobuono, rather than Volt, controlled the
outcome of the case. 93 Rather than looking to the state law pursuant to the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 351, 355-56.
See id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 361-62.
Id.
See id. at 361-63.
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parties’ choice-of-law clause to determine whether the parties intended to
incorporate California’s arbitration-limiting rules into their agreement, the
Court followed Mastrobuono’s rule of interpretation and held that the
choice-of-law clause did not incorporate the talent-agency law.94
In 2010, the Court in Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.95 adopted another federal common law rule of interpretation under the
FAA. The Court held that the FAA does not permit arbitrators to allow class
arbitration unless authorized by the parties’ arbitration agreement. 96
The Court began its analysis by stating: “While the interpretation of an
arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, the FAA imposes
certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic precept that
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’”97
Based on the principle that the FAA’s primary purpose was to give
effect to the parties’ agreements, the Court stated that “a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” 98 The Court
distinguished an arbitrator’s authority to decide procedural questions not
expressly included in the arbitration clause: unlike purely procedural
matters, “class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a
degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply
agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”99 In bilateral arbitration,
“parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in
order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater
efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes.” 100 In the Court’s view, however, class arbitration
increases costs and complexity, threatens confidentiality, binds absent
parties, and generally conflicts with parties’ assumptions about arbitration.101
An arbitrator therefore does not have the power to impose class arbitration

94. Id. at 362-63.
95. Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
96. See id. at 1776.
97. Id. at 1773 (citations omitted) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
98. Id. at 1775.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1776.
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without the parties’ consent.102 Thus, arbitrators exceed their authority if
they order class arbitration in the absence of party agreement. 103
Although the result in Stolt–Nielsen was to restrict the scope of
arbitrators’ authority,104 the decision was nevertheless an important
precursor for Concepcion. The Court in Stolt–Nielsen built upon years of
opinions tilting arbitral federalism toward federal law in both the
interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements; indeed, it began its
analysis from the principle that the FAA imposes limits on state contract law
when interpreting arbitration agreements. The Court held that federal
principles—primarily party autonomy—prevent arbitrators from imposing
rules that “change[] the nature of arbitration” as envisioned by the Court.105
The idea that the FAA envisions an arbitration process that is less costly,
less formal, more efficient, and speedier than litigation was at the heart of
the Court’s decision in Concepcion.106
III. CONCEPCION
In Concepcion, the Court moved further toward the federalization of
arbitration law based on its view that California’s version of the
unconscionability doctrine as applied to classwide dispute resolution stood
as an obstacle to the FAA’s pro-arbitration goal.107 As in Stolt–Nielsen, the
Court held that the FAA supposes certain attributes of arbitration that class
arbitration alters.108 In Stolt–Nielsen, the Court held that the FAA prevents
arbitrators from imposing class arbitration absent party agreement; 109 in
Concepcion, the Court held that even generally applicable state contract law

102. See id.
103. Id. It is not clear to what extent courts after Stolt–Nielsen may look to state law to
determine whether the parties implicitly agreed to permit class arbitration. For example, could a
court find implicit agreement if the parties select a particular state law as governing their agreement,
and that state law grants arbitrators the authority to permit class arbitration (assuming, under
Preston, that any arbitral rules incorporated into the arbitration agreement are silent on class
arbitration)?
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1775.
106. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
107. Id.
108. Id. See also Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758.
109. Stolt–Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758.
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cannot do so.110
arbitration law.

Both decisions further expand the reach of federal

A. Background to the Case
Like Southland, Perry, Volt, and Preston, Concepcion presented a
potential conflict between California state law and the FAA on the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. The plaintiffs in Concepcion
brought a putative class action alleging that AT&T Mobility committed
fraud when it offered a free phone to customers who signed up for its
services but still charged them sales tax on the phones.111 AT&T Mobility
argued that the claims had to be submitted to individual arbitration because
the service contracts with the plaintiffs included an arbitration clause
waiving the right to class arbitration. 112 The district court found that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under the
FAA.113 The Ninth Circuit agreed. 114
The Ninth Circuit noted that section 2 of the FAA permits invalidation
of arbitration agreements on generally applicable state law grounds and that
unconscionability is such a ground. 115 The Ninth Circuit looked to the
Supreme Court of California’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court116 for California law on the unconscionability of class action
waivers.117 In Discover Bank, the Supreme Court of California held that
class action waivers are unconscionable:
[W]hen the [class] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of
damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
118
small sums of money . . . .

The Ninth Circuit interpreted Discover Bank to create a three-part
inquiry to determine when a class action waiver in a consumer contract is
unconscionable: (1) whether the agreement is a contract of adhesion; (2)

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2009).
See id.
Id. at 857.
See id. at 853, 859.
Id.
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
Laster, 584 F.3d at 854.
Id. (quoting Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1109).
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whether disputes between the contracting parties are likely to involve small
sums of money; and (3) whether it is alleged that the party with superior
bargaining power deliberately cheated many consumers out of small sums of
money.119 The Ninth Circuit applied this test and held that the class action
waiver in the contract before it was unconscionable. 120
The Ninth Circuit also held that the FAA did not preempt the Discover
Bank test.121 It concluded that Discover Bank simply applied California’s
general approach to unconscionability “in the specific context of class action
waivers,” which is permitted under FAA section 2’s Saving Clause.122 In the
court’s view, California law treated class action waivers in arbitration
agreements the same as class action waivers in other types of contracts not
involving arbitration, and therefore all contracts with class action waivers
were treated equally.123 The Discover Bank test was thus a “ground[ ] [that]
exist[s] at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”124
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Concepcion to decide
“[w]hether the [FAA] preempts States from conditioning the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement on the availability of . . . classwide arbitration.”125
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that section 2 of the FAA preempts the
Discover Bank rule. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined. Justice
Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that made clear that he reluctantly
joined the majority, while Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.126

119. Id. at 854.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 857.
123. Id.
124. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 6617833.
126. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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1. The Majority Opinion
The Court began its analysis by noting the FAA’s purpose of ending the
“widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” 127 The Court then
explained that section 2 of the FAA furthers this purpose by establishing a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration and requiring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements like any other contract. 128 To determine whether a
state-judicially-created rule is preempted under section 2, the Court held that
it is not sufficient that the rule is the result of an application of a common
law contract defense like unconscionability; a court must also analyze
whether the application of the traditional contract defense interferes with a
purpose of the FAA. 129
The Court conceded that the question in the case was not easy, noting
that state laws prohibiting the arbitration of particular claims are clearly
preempted, but that “the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine
normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant
here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that
disfavors arbitration.”130 In the Court’s view, unconscionability ordinarily
might be considered a ground that exists “at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract,” but it could become a tool for expressing
judicial hostility to arbitration by invalidating, for example, agreements that
fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery, application of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, or a trial by jury. 131 The Court did not believe that these
examples were very far from the requirement of classwide arbitration. 132
The essential question, in the Court’s view, was whether California’s
application of the unconscionability doctrine “interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.”133
The Court held that the Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with the
FAA’s purpose of “ensur[ing] the enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”134 The
Court explained that “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing
arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1745.
See id. at 1745-46.
Id. at 1745.
Id. at 1747.
Id.
Id. at 1747-48.
Id. at 1748.
Id.
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to the type of dispute.”135 The Discover Bank rule allows a party to demand
class arbitration notwithstanding a waiver of class arbitration in the
arbitration agreement, which conflicts with the goal of streamlined
procedures—it slows down the arbitral process, makes arbitration more
costly, requires procedural formality when informality would be preferred,
entrusts arbitrators with the due process rights of absent class members, and
subjects defendants to the risk of large judgments without appellate rights,
and with only limited means to vacate an award. 136
Given the
inconsistencies between mandatory classwide arbitration and the goals of
party autonomy and efficient arbitral procedures, the Court held that the
Discover Bank rule conflicted with Congress’s purposes expressed in the
FAA and was therefore preempted. 137
2. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
Justice Thomas “reluctantly” joined the Court’s opinion.138 He argued
that “the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a
party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement,
such as by proving fraud or duress.” 139 Justice Thomas explained that the
term “revocation” in section 2’s Saving Clause should be read in conjunction
with section 4 of the FAA, which requires courts to enforce arbitration
agreements unless the making of an agreement is at issue. 140 Under the
historical understanding of unconscionability—for which Justice Thomas
cited federal law—a contract is considered not to be validly formed when it
is so unfair as to raise the presumption that it is the product of fraud, duress,
or delusion.141 The Discover Bank rule departed from this traditional
understanding because the rule was based on the idea that a contractual
waiver of class dispute resolution is “exculpatory” and against public policy,

135. Id. at 1749.
136. See id. at 1750-53.
137. See id. at 1753.
138. Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 1755.
140. See id. at 1754-55.
141. See id. at 1755 n.*. Justice Thomas noted that the footnote in Perry v. Thomas, discussed
above, was dictum because the Court in that case had no need to decide the scope of the contract
defenses that were preserved under section 2’s Saving Clause. Id.
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not that it could only have been the product of improper coercion or an
unsound mind and was thus not validly formed. 142 Because the Discover
Bank rule presupposed the formation of a contract, but rendered the contract
invalid, it differed from the traditional definition of unconscionability and
was not a matter of contract formation; therefore, the contract was not
protected from preemption under section 2’s Saving Clause.
3. The Dissenting Opinion
In Justice Breyer’s dissent,143 the Discover Bank rule was the Supreme
Court of California’s authoritative interpretation and application of
California’s unconscionability doctrine, which applied equally to arbitration
agreements and contracts providing for litigation.144 It therefore fell
squarely under the language of the Saving Clause. 145
Justice Breyer argued that the Discover Bank rule was consistent with
the primary purpose of the FAA—to place arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts.146 He disagreed that the FAA demands any
particular procedures and instead emphasized that Discover Bank simply
applied the same state unconscionability rules as were applied to class action
waivers in contracts that do not contain arbitration clauses.147 Moreover, he
disagreed that the Discover Bank rule necessarily made arbitration more
complex and less efficient. 148 Justice Breyer contended that there was
insufficient evidence that the rule would discourage parties from agreeing to
arbitrate.149
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s holding imposed a
federal view of contract defenses that is not required by the text or purpose
of the FAA.150 He noted that federal arbitration law leaves contract defenses
to the states, and that “California is free to define unconscionability as it sees
fit.”151 As long as a state does not adopt a special rule that disfavors
arbitration, “its common law is of no federal concern.” 152 In Justice Breyer’s

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 1755.
See id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1756-57.
Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1757.
See id. at 1757-58.
See id. at 1758-59.
See id. at 1759-60.
Id. at 1756.
Id. at 1760.
Id.

392

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss3/1

20

Boyle and Cinotti: Beyond Nondiscrimination: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the

[Vol. 12: 373, 2012]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

view, the FAA imposes a limited restraint on state sovereignty in an area
traditionally reserved to the states—it requires equal treatment of arbitration
agreements but does not elevate arbitration agreements over other types of
contracts.153 In the Saving Clause, Congress “reiterated a basic federal idea
that has long informed the nature of this Nation’s laws.”154 According to
Justice Breyer, the Court’s decision violated “that federalist ideal” by
invading the province of the states, even though the language of the FAA
reaffirms state control over contract defenses. 155
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CONCEPCION
As Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion concluded, Concepcion does not
merely have far-reaching consequences for consumer class actions, as has
been widely reported. 156 The dissenters argued that the majority improperly
read into the FAA a license to alter the traditional federal–state balance in
contract law, in direct contravention of the FAA’s Saving Clause.157
Concepcion pushes the Court’s FAA jurisprudence further toward the
federalization of arbitration law and contributes to the diminution of state
law’s role in the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements.
The decision packs a specific view of arbitration into the long-standing,
but vaguely-articulated, federal pro-arbitration policy, and elevates that
federal view of arbitration over the rule that arbitration agreements should be
treated like any other state law contracts. 158 Not only must a state contract
law doctrine be one that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract, it must also be applied in a manner that does not conflict with
“fundamental attributes of arbitration” as envisioned by the FAA. Thus,
section 2’s Saving Clause does not preserve the application of all generally
applicable common law contract defenses, only those that are consistent with
the federal view of what arbitration should look like.
This additional federal check on state contract law accords with the
general trend of the U.S. Supreme Court’s cases on arbitral federalism.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 1761.
Id. at 1762.
See id.
Id. at 1761.
Id. at 1762.
Id.
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Since Moses H. Cone and Southland, the Court has steadily enlarged the role
of federal common law under the FAA, even if it has sometimes done so
implicitly. The one notable exception to this trend—the Court’s decision in
Volt—has been significantly undermined by Mastrobuono and Preston. The
Court’s decisions curtailing the application of state arbitration and contract
law impose rules that:
xan arbitration agreement is separable from the contract in which it is contained and
thus can be enforced even if the underlying contract is allegedly
159
unenforceable (Prima Paint);
xdoubts regarding the scope of an arbitration agreement are resolved in favor of
160
arbitration (Moses H. Cone);
xa court, rather than an arbitrator, has primary authority to decide whether a party
has agreed to arbitrate unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree
161
otherwise (First Options);
xstate law selected in a generic choice-of-law clause does not limit the power of
arbitrators granted by arbitral rules incorporated into the parties’ arbitration
162
clause (Mastrobuono and Preston);
xstate law defenses to arbitration are preempted when those defenses apply only to
163
arbitration agreements and not to contracts generally (Doctor’s Associates);
and
xarbitrators and courts cannot compel class arbitration when the parties’ arbitration
agreement is silent on the matter because doing so alters the nature of
164
arbitration (Stolt–Nielsen).

Some of the federal rules stated in the Court’s pre-Concepcion FAA
decisions might be considered rules of interpretation; others might be
considered rules of enforcement. But all of them demonstrate that federal
arbitration law does much more than make arbitration agreements
enforceable under state law like any other contracts. Concepcion follows
these precedents by protecting arbitration agreements against state versions
of traditional contract defenses that disrupt the federal view of arbitration’s
basic principles—such as low cost, speed, and efficiency—even if the state
law equally applies to other types of contracts.
The fact that the Court’s federalization of arbitration law has invaded
the Saving Clause is especially notable. The language of the clause itself

159. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
160. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
161. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
162. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Preston v. Ferrer, 552
U.S. 346 (2008).
163. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
164. Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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suggests that it was meant to preserve some state control over arbitration
agreements, just as state law governs other types of contracts.
After Concepcion, however, application of state contract law to
invalidate arbitration clauses due to the lack of specific procedures in
arbitration—not just the right to class arbitration—will be suspect. For
example, an arbitration clause could not be considered unconscionable
merely because it does not allow for discovery or other procedural rights that
might be seen to complicate or slow down the arbitration, even if state
legislatures or courts view the lack of those procedures as unfair. This result
significantly dilutes the anti-preemptive effect of the Saving Clause and
once again emphasizes that arbitration agreements—at least those coming
within the wide grasp of the Commerce Clause—are primarily the domain of
federal law.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress passed the FAA more than a decade before the U.S. Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,165 which gave
rise to a long line of cases considering the proper roles of federal and state
law in diversity cases (as most federal cases under the FAA are). It is
therefore not surprising that the FAA itself provides little guidance on
federalism questions, and that the courts have resorted to federal common
law to fill the deep statutory gaps. The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that
FAA section 2 creates federal substantive law regarding the interpretation
and enforcement of arbitration agreements began a series of common
lawmaking decisions regarding difficult questions of federal preemption,
including the question presented in Concepcion. The Concepcion opinion
addresses one of those problems by holding that even traditional common
law contract defenses, like unconscionability, can stand as an obstacle to the
goals of the FAA when they interfere with the federal policy of encouraging
streamlined and efficient arbitral procedures. This result once again expands
the sphere of federal power over arbitration agreements at the expense of
state contract law.
It is notable that the advocates of state power on the Court, including
Justices Scalia and Thomas, voted in the majority to find preemption of state

165. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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contract law, while Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—
whom some might consider more likely to support federal authority—argued
in dissent that the majority failed to honor the “federalist ideal.” The effect
that Concepcion has on federalism may be used as an argument in favor of
undoing the Court’s decision through legislative action. Congress can use
its Commerce Clause power to make class action waivers, or consumer
arbitration agreements in general, unenforceable under the FAA. Bills that
have been introduced in Congress over the last few congressional terms seek
to do so.166 In addition to citing the effect that Concepcion may have on
classwide dispute resolution, proponents of change may employ federalism
arguments to support the call for amendments to the FAA.

166. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
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